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I. A model of financial equilibrium, 412.—II. Effects of changes in the profit tax
rate, 418.—III. Effects of changes in the taxation of retained earnings, 423.—IV. The
nonneutrality of the corporate income tax, 427.—V. Conclusion, 430.
Tbis paper presents a model of corporate financial policy in a
growing economy and then uses this model to study the effects of
changes in corporate and personal taxes. Our picture of the firm in-
cludes a flexible debt-equity ratio and a flexible dividend payout rate.
The costs to the firm of both debt and equity capital are increasing
functions of the firm's debt-equity ratio. We use a realistic description
of the tax system that includes a corporate income tax with deductible
interest expenses, a personal income tax, and a favorable tax treat-
ment of retained earnings.
Our work builds on earlier research^ on both corporate finance
and taxation but provides a more general and realistic model. This
new model implies a unique optimal debt-equity ratio instead of the
indeterminacy associated with the Modigliani-Miller tradition. The
model also implies that firms will choose a positive equilibrium payout
rate in spite of the favorable taxation of retained earnings. We know
of no other model that explains why firms simultaneously borrow and
pay dividends in an economy witb corporate and personal
taxation.
The model is presented and explained in Section I. The second
and third sections then examine the effects of changes in the corporate
tax rate and in the differential between the taxation of dividends and
of retained earnings. The nonneutrality of the corporation tax is
discussed more generally in Section IV.
* We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support under
grant numbers SOC7.5-14656, SOC71-03803, and SOC74-11446. This paper is part of
the NBER Research Program in Business Taxation and Finance. The revision of this
paper benefited from comments by participants in the NBER workshop, by a referee
of this Journal, and by Alan Auerbach, Gregory Ballentine, Joel Slemrod, and Lawrence
Summers.
1. See in particular Harberger [1962], Modigliani and Miller [1958], Miller [1976]
and its useful bibliography, Lintner [1964], Solow [1971], Stiglitz [1973, 1976], and
Jakobsson [1974], as well as our own previous research reported in Feldstein, Green,
and Sheshinski [1978].
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The framework for our analysis is an economy in steady-state
growth with a fixed saving rate. To avoid the usual complexities and
ambiguities of corporate tax shifting in a two-sector model, we assume
that all business activity takes a corporate form. These simplifying
assumptions allow us to focus on the effects of the tax system on fi-
nancial hehavior (the deht-equity ratio and the dividend payout rate)
and on the after-tax yields on stocks and bonds. The implications of
recognizing a noncorporate business sector and of allowing the saving
rate to vary with asset yields are discussed briefly in Section IV.
I. A MODEL OF FINANCIAL EQUILIBRIUM
In order to study these questions, we extend the simple one-
sector, nonmonetary growth model to include a specification of the
financial behavior of firms and households. By virtue of the as-
sumptions that aggregate savings are insensitive to the rate of return
and that population grows exogenously at a fixed rate n, the econo-
my's capital-labor ratio will be constant in the long-run equilibria that
we analyze. Under the usual neoclassical conditions, this means that
the gross rate of return per unit of capital /' is also a constant.
In the following subsections we discuss the behavior of firms and
investors in the context of a simple tax structure that is designed to
capture the basic features of the U. S. tax system.
1.1. Firms' Decisions and the Post- and Pre-Tax Returns
The decision variables on which we focus are concerned with the
way in which investment is financed. There are two financial instru-
ments, debt and equity; the proportion of capital financed by debt
is denoted b. Firms must also choose their payout rate p, which is the
fraction of the total return to equity holders (before any personal taxes
are paid) that they receive in the form of dividends.
As a first step in the analysis, it is necessary to relate the net-
of-tax yields of investors to the corresponding costs of finance to firms.
Debt costs the firm i per unit of capital raised, and this return is taxed
at the personal interest income rate d. Thus, the net rate return to
bond holders is
(1.1) IN = i(l - 6).
The return to equity is e and consists of pe paid in the form of
dividends and (1 — p)e retained for capital accumulation by the firm.^
2. This assumes that the increase in the market value of the firm resulting from
acquiring a dollar's worth of capital goods is one dollar; i.e., that Tobin's parameter
q equals one [Tobin, 1969]. This is a crucial difference between our analysis and that
of Auerbach [1979] and Bradford [1978].CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY AND TAXATION 413
We assume that dividends are taxed at the same rate as interest but
that retained earnings are in effect taxed at a lower rate (ixd), where
II is between zero and one. The reason for the effectively preferential
treatment of retained earnings is that no personal taxes are levied on
corporate income held within the firm. Taxes £ire paid upon realization
of the resulting gains, but they are below the ordinary income tax rate
both because of the differential treatment of capital gains and because
of the delay that is typically entailed in taxing only realized capital
gains. Overall, the net return to equity is, therefore,
(1.2) eN = pe(l - 6)-^ (1 - p)e(l - fid).
It will be convenient to have a special symbol for the effective rate
of taxation on equity income, which depends on the firm's control
variable p as well as the tax rate; let
(1.3) X = p(l - 6)-i-(1 - p)(l - nd)
so that
(1.4) ejv = ex.
Before the decisions of the firm can be studied, we must describe
the economic environment in which it is embedded. Its securities must
compete with those of other firms that are substitutes, but not perfect
substitutes because their risk characteristics differ. From the
household investors' point of view, the relevant variables are assumed
to be the expected returns net of tax offered on the two types of
securities issued, and the risk characteristics of these assets as de-
termined by the debt-equity ratio the firm has chosen.
We shall use carets to denote the variables relating to all other
firms collectively considered; the offered returns are e^ and i^ for
equity and debt, respectively. The debt per unit of capital held by all
other firms is 5.
In an equilibrium the firms' sources and uses of funds must be
in balance. Its gross income per unit of capital is /'. Interest costs of
bi per unit of capital are deductible for tax purposes. The residual is
taxed at the rate r. The return to equity holders per unit of equity
before personal taxation is thus defined as
(1.5) (1 - T)(/' - bi)/(l -b) = e.
We assume that a firm, in marketing its. securities, perceives
rising supply prices for both debt and equity capital as its debt-equity
ratio rises.^ This assumption is clearly contradictory to the extreme
3. We assume that both prices rise, although our analysis requires only that at
least one rise.414 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
form of the Modigliani-Miller view that the debt-equity ratio has no
effect on the costs of either debt or equity. As we note below, this
Modigliani-Miller view is not compatible with an interior solution for
corporate debt policy. We also share the view of Myers [1977] and
others that a high debt-equity ratio restricts a firm's real investment
options, thereby reducing the value of its shares. In addition, we reject
the extreme view that "home-made leverage" and corporate leverage
are perfect substitutes.
It will be most convenient to express these schedules as giving
the net required return to investors. They also depend upon the
debt-equity ratio of all other firms 5, and their promised returns to
the two types of securities, net of personal taxes i^ and e^:
eN = \[/ib,6,eM,iN)-
Higher returns available elsewhere, eN and i^, shift these schedules
up. More riskiness in the "market" portfolio 6 will have the opposite
effect. We shall assume that the cross-partials of the </> and xp schedules
are zero.'*
We are now ready to discuss the way in which firms operate.
Firms choose b and p so as to minimize the net cost of capital N, de-
fined as
(1.7) N=b(l-T}i-i-(l-b)e.
It is important to remember that i and e in this formula are inter-
preted as the supply prices to the firm. The economic actions of other
firms enter into this decision problem as parameters of the 0 and \p
functions. Note that minimizing the cost of capital is equivalent to
maximizing the present value of the equity in the company with our
assumption that a dollar of retained earnings adds one dollar to the
market value of the firm.^
Although it is clear that the risk considerations that make the
firm's costs of debt and equity an increasing function of b cause the
firm to find an optimal mixture of debt and equity, it is natural to ask
why such a firm would ever pay dividends. By retaining everything
possible (p =0), the firm can apparently lower the effective tax rate
on equity earnings (x) and thus lower the cost of equity finance as-
4. Perhaps a more natural assumption would be that the elasticities with respect
to b are independent of the levels of the other variables, but this would complicate the
comparative statics significantly, without adding much of interest. The results do not
depend in any way on the assumed effects of ejv, IN, and 6 on the individual firm's cost
of funds schedules.
5. This equivalence is discussed by Auerbach in the current issue of this Journal
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sociated with any fixed level of the net return to equity holders. Since
p is not an argument of 0 or \}/, the policy p = 0 would seem always to
be the best.
The answer to this line of argument is that if all earnings were
retained, the equity of the firm would grow at a rate equal to the rate
of return on equity gross of personal income tax. In order to maintain^
a constant debt-equity ratio, debt finance must also increase at the
same rate. Hence the policy p = 0 may force the firm's total capital
stock to grow at a rate that exceeds the rate of growth of the economy.
In this event the risk class represented by this firm's securities would
become very large relative to the market, and it would not be able to
raise enough capital in the long run. Since we are restricting firms to
choose steady policies only, such a program would be infeasible. The
firm could sustain a rate of growth higher than the economy as a whole
in the short run only, but the ensuing shifts in the 0 and xp schedules
would eventually cause the zero profit condition to be violated.
The rate of growth of the effective labor force is denoted by n.
The firm operates under the constraint, n ^ (1 — p)e. Growing at a
faster rate would cause the firm to become too large a risk relative to
the remainder of the economy and would thus raise its cost of capital.
The firm's problem is therefore
(1.8) min N = bil - T)i + (1 - b)e
subject to
(1.8a) n^(l-p)e.
Writing the cost of capital as
(1.9) N = b{\- T) 4>/{\ - ^) -H (1 - 6) ^|/|x,
we see that the Lagrangean for this problem is
(1.10) L = 6(1 - T) -^ + (1 - 6) '^ + p (n - (1 - p) A,
\- d X \ xj
where p is the Lagrange multiplier of the growth-rate constraint.
Differentiating with respect to b, p, and p, we obtain the firm's opti-
mality conditions:
(1.11) 0 = :; {iN + bcj)') + V - P
\ — V XX
(1.12) 0 = (1 - 6)eN(M^ - O)lx'^ + peNi-x + (1
6. ^Ve consider only steady policies—that is, choices of p and b that could be
pursued indefinitely—throughout this paper.416 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
(1.13) 0 = n - (1 - p)eN/x,
where 4>' and \)/' are the derivatives with respect to b. Solving (1.12)
for p, we have
(1.14) P = -(1 - 6)^(1 - M)/(1 - e).
Note that p is negative as might have been anticipated. A higher
growth rate would make feasible a financial policy in which retentions
increase sheltering equity income to a greater extent, thus lowering
the gross return equivalent to the required net return.
Substituting the solution for p into (1.11) and simplifying, we
obtain
(1.15) o = ^(iN + 6<^')-^ + ^V
1 1
Equations (1.13) and (1.15) describe the first-order conditions
for the firm's problem of selecting a debt proportion b and a payout
ratio p that minimizes the cost of capital subject to the firm's equity
growth constraint.^
1.2. Aggregate Portfolio Balance Conditions
The analysis above is a complete specification of the suppliers
of corporate securities. To close the system, some description of in-
vestors' risk preferences and their resulting market behavior must
be given. The simplest method is to write the market's desired, or
acceptable, level of debt per unit of capital as
(1.16) 5 = 7,iiN
The sign of TJ' can be either positive or negative. We shall deal
primarily with the case of ?7' = 0 to isolate risk changes from other
effects, but we shall also discuss other cases.
Because of the symmetry of firms, in equilibrium the market
(careted) variables will equal the corresponding firm-specific variables
h = b, iN = iN, ^N = ^N- This reduces the system to a determination
of b, iN, eN, and p. Of course, in this determination each individual
7. For a given economic environment, as specified by o, er^, in, n, and the functiona
0 and ypt the term's choice of 6 and p that minimizes the cost of capital may not also
satisfy the equilibrium cash flow condition (1.5). If these choices were actually affected.
Inhere would be a surplus or deficit in the firm of 2 = (/' — bi)(l — \p) — e(l — b), which
it is natural to assume, would accrue to equity as they are the residual claimants. Thus,
the true disequilibrium return to equity would be 2/(1 — 6) + e. Investors would be
off their \l/ schedules, and an adjustment would be necessary. In this papet we do not
give any specification of the process of achieving equilibrium. It vvould be necessary
to do so if one were to use the assumed stability of such a mechanism to derive com-
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firm treats the market variables (6, iN, e^v) as given parameters of its
own problem.
1.3. The Complete System
Using equations (1.3) and (1.8a) to write p in terms of x and the
rate of growth, we see that in the long run, the system can be specified
by the four relations,
(1.17) 0 = fc - VUN -
(1.18) 0 = /'--^-^^
1 — 0 1 — T X
(1.19) 0 = (1 - fi)exn - {x-i-e- l)eN
(1.20)
which are, respectively, the portfolio balance condition, the financial
balance condition, and the two first-order conditions for the firm's
optimization.
Notation
For the reader's convenience, before proceeding, our notation
is recapitulated below in tabular form:
Tax Rates
d = personal income tax rate, applicable to interest and dividend
income.
nd = personal tax rate on retained earnings (through eventual
capital gains).
T = corporate tax rate on profits; interest is deductible.
Financial Variables for the Firm
e = cost of equity finance.
i = cost of debt finance.
b = debt as a proportion of capital.
p = payout rate, the proportion of post-corporate tax earnings
paid in the form of dividends.
eN = the supply price for net rate of return on equity of the
firm.
iN = the supply price for net rate of return on debt of the firm.418 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Macroeconomic Variables
f = gross return per unit of capital.
n = rate of growth.
0 = market debt as a proportion of capital stock.
eN = market rate of return on equity.
iN = market rate of return on debt.
II. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE PROFIT TAX RATE
In this section we examine how an increase in the rate of profits
tax affects the decisions of the representative firm and the net returns
to debt and equity investors. The differential taxation of dividends
and retained earnings (i.e., the value of ;tt) is assumed to remain un-
changed.^
Our analysis will focus primarily on the case in which ??' = 0; i.e.,
in which the debt-to-capital ratio (6) remains fixed because the
market's demand for relative quantities of debt and equity is not
sensitive to differences in their yields. We focus on this case because
only when b is constant can the predicted changes in ejv and iN be
interpreted unambiguously. With a fixed debt-capital ratio, the values
of eA^ and tjv are good reflections of the welfare of the owners of debt
and equity capital. In contrast, when b changes in response to a change
in the tax law, parts of the observed changes in eN and iN reflect
compensation for the new level of risk associated with the new value
of 6.9
Totally differentiating equations (1.17)-(1.20) in the general case
oi 7]' 7^ 0 with respect to b, eN, iN, ^, and the predetermined r
(2.1)
1
1
— T
-0
1
IN
0
z
eN
X
1
V'
1-6
X
— X —
1
X
1
1
0
1
1
-v'
-T
-0
0
— T
(1
(1
0 '
-b)eN
X2
- fi)en - eN
db
deN
diN
dx
8. Section III considers changes in n as well as compensated increases in T and
decreases in (i that keep total tax revenue unchanged. In contrast, the increase in T in
the current section increases tax revenues.
9. A more complete analysis of risk and risk aversion would be required to provide
a precise welfare measure.
10. Recall that we have assumed that the cross-derivatives of 0 and l/' are zero.CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY AND TAXATION 419
1-6
0
lAT -I-
-r
dr.
where Z = d'^N/db^. The second-order condition for choosing b to
minimize the cost of capital implies that Z > 0.
2.1. The Debt-Capital Ratio
Although we shall concentrate on the case in which inelastic
market demand (r?' = 0) keeps the debt-capital ratio {b) fixed, it is
useful to examine first the effect of the corporation tax on the debt
ratio in the more general case in which rj' ^ 0. Solving (2.1) implies
that
(2.2)
dr
1-e
{{1 - ^l)en -
{1-x-6)
where A, the determinant of the matrix in (2.1), is
1-T. . .1-b
(2.3) A = Y3^^+^'Z-77'7
1-6 1-Q
Zb\.
Consider first the case in which ??' > 0. Equations (2.2) and (2.3)
show unambiguously that the introduction of a corporate income tax
induces a substitution of debt for equity finance when r = 0. Equa-
tions (2.2) and (2.3) then yield
(2.4) - b<f>' : + ((1 - ^l)en -
{l-x-6)\\>0.
since (1 - ti)6n = {{6 - l)ew)/x < 0 and (1 - x - 6*) = -(1 - p)(l -
iu.)6 < 0. It is easy to understand the reason for this. The corporation
tax permits the deduction of interest payments in the calculation of
taxable income. It thus raises the cost to the firm of providing a dollar420 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
of net equity income relative to the cost of providing net interest in-
come. The firm's cost of capital is therefore minimized by substituting
debt for equity. The extent of this substitution is limited by the
market's reaction to the increased riskiness implied by an increasing
ratio of debt to equity.
If T]' < 0, the numerator is negative, and db/dT > 0 only if the
denominator is also negative. The sign of the denominator can be
negative if rj' < 0, but without quantitative information on the mag-
nitudes of 7]' and Z, it is not possible to be certain of the sign. Stability
considerations do not provide a definite answer unless arbitrary re-
strictions are imposed on the adjustment process.
2.2. The Net Rate of Interest
Previous studies of the corporation tax have not provided a sat-
isfactory analysis of the effect of the tax on the net rate of interest
received by bondholders. Harherger's [1962] discussion of corporate
tax incidence ignored debt completely and assumed that all invest-
ment is equity financed. Stiglitz [1973] considered the opposite ex-
treme case in which all marginal investment is financed by debt and
therefore in which a change in the corporate tax rate does not alter
the net rate of interest; i.e., diN/dT = 0.
We now show that when firms combine debt and equity finance,
the introduction of a corporation tax (or the increase in a pre-existing
tax rate) with full interest deductibility reduces the net yield to
bondholders. To ahstract from changes in JAT that just compensate
for the increased debt-equity ratio, we consider the case in which T?'
= 0 and therefore b is constant. Equations (2.1) and (2.3) then imply
that
(2.5) ^ =
d 1 - T
Using (1.18) and (1.20), we see that a lower bound on the bracketed
expression in (2.5) can be obtained under the condition \p' = 0, as
This expression can be seen to be positive. Therefore, diN/dT is always
negative. (Typically, \p' will be positive even when 0' is very small
because equity risk is more sensitive to corporate leverage than is the
default risk on debt.)
It may at first seem paradoxical that a higher rate of corporation
tax changes the yield on debt even though interest payments are fullyCORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY AND TAXATION 421
deductible in calculating the corporation's taxable income. Looked
at in this way, it would seem that the interest rate should be unaf-
fected by a corporation tax and that all of the tax should be absorbed
by a reduction in equity income.^^ Such an outcome is not compatible
with the firms' financing and cost minimization conditions (equations
(1.18), (1.19), and (1.20)). If the interest rate remained unchanged,
firms would try to reduce their supply of bonds; since rj' = 0 implies
that b cannot change, equilibrium must be re-established by a fall in
iN-
To obtain an indication of the order of magnitude of the effect
of changes in the corporate tax rate, we can evaluate equation (2.5)
for plausible values of the relevant parameters under the further as-
sumption that <!>' = 0.^2 We shall set the effective rate of corporate
income tax at r = 0.40 and the personal tax rate on bond interest and
dividend income at6 = 0.30, values that are roughly appropriate for
the United States. The marginal product of capital of U. S. nonfi-
nancial corporations has been about/' = 0.11 in the past twenty-five
years [Feldstein and Summers, 1977]. The real rate of interest on
medium grade corporate bonds has been approximately i = 0.03.'^
Substituting these figures into (2.5) implies that diN/dT = —0.093.
An increase in the effective corporate tax rate by 0.1 (i.e., from 0.40
to 0.50) would lower iN by 0.93 percentage points. Since i = 0.03 and
0 = 0.3 imply iN = 0.021, this would cut the net yield nearly in half.
Note also that a fall of 0.93 in iN implies a fall of 0.93/(1 -6) = 1.3
percentage points in the real rate of interest, from 3.0 to 1.7
percent.^*
2.3. The Net Yield on Equity
The fall in the net rate of interest that we have just calculated
shows that the burden of the corporation tax is borne by both debt
and equity investors. To assess the share borne by each, we must
complement the calculation of the previous section by calculating the
effect on eN of an increase in the corporate tax rate.
11. Recall that we are dealing with the case of 7/' = 0 in which individual investors
wish to hold the same portfolio regardless of the relative values of i^' and e^. With rj'
> 0, a fall in e^/ would increase the households demand for bonds and this in turn would
be a further reason for ijv to fall.
12. The magnitude of 0 cannot be ascertained in general, since it depends on the
substitutability among debt issues in investors' portfolios. Close substitutability implies
that 0 is small.
13. During a decade of relative price stability (1954-1964), the yield on Moody's
Baa bonds averaged 4.6 percent and the implicit price deflator for gross domestic
product rose at 2.0 percent a year.
14. The issue is more complex where there is a positive rate of inflation. See
Feldstein, Green, and Sheshinski [1978].422 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
It follows directly from equations (2.1) and (2.3), that, with rj' =
0,
.. ., deN [(I - n)en -eNUr + {b^cp/l - 6))
(Z.b) —— = ; .
dT eN/x
Since equation (1.19) imphes that (1 - /.i)dn - eN = (9 - l)eN/x, we
have that when 4>' = 0, (2.6) simplifies to
(2.7) ^=-(i-0)f'_
dT
This is a striking result. It implies that the reduction in the equilih-
rium equity yield in response to an increase in the corporate tax rate
is independent of the deht-equity ratio, the dividend payout rate, and
the preferential treatment of retained earnings^^ when corporations'
horrowing rates are perfectly elastic.
The numerical values suggested ahove imply that deN/dT =
—0.077. An increase in the corporate tax rate from 0.40 to 0.50 would
thus lower ejv hy 0.77 percentage points, less than the reduction in
the net interest rate.
Total income of equity investors per dollar of capital is EN =
(1 — b)eN and the corresponding income of hondholders is /;v =^ biN.
The relative income changes can therefore hy written directly from
equation (2.1) as
dEN/dT 1 -
dlN/dr b
b
_fl-
i b
c
)
UN
T
-
H -r)
Wx)(l - r)/(l - d)r
w-.N/a-o))
f'-i'
With our values of ,T = 0.40, /' = 0.11, and i = 0.03, and b = 0.03,
dE^ldT = 1.925 (dl/v/dT). Equity owners bear only ahout 66 percent
of the tax, even though they account for 92 percent of the pretax
corporate income and 89 percent of the after-tax income.^^
15. Note that equations (2.5) and (2.7) together imply that introducing a new
corporate income tax reduces the earnings on the average portfoh'o of debt and equity
i>yd[biN + (1 - b)eN]dT = -(1 - d)(f' - bi). This is of course just the revenue raised
by taxing the return to equity, f — bi, when the net income is otherwise subject to
personal tax at rate 6.
16. On a pretax basis, bondholders receive only bi = 0.009 per dollar of capital
while equity receives (before tax) (1 - 6)e = /' - bi = 0.101 per dollar of capital. Net
of tax, bondholders receive (1 - d)bi = 0.0063 per dollar of capital. To calculate the
net income of equity investors, (1 - 6)eyv = x(l - b)e, note that x = p(l — 9) -t- (I-
p)(l - fid). Values of p = 0.5 for the dividend payout ratio and n = 0.2 for the relativeCORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY AND TAXATION 423
2.4. The Dividend Payout Ratio
We turn finally to the effect of the corporation tax on the divi-
dend payout ratio p. Recall that the balanced growth of the corpo-
ration at the common growth rate of the economy {n) requires that
the corporation's equity also grow at this rate. Equation (1.8a) noted
that this balanced growth condition could be written as
(2.9) n = {l-p)e.
If we substitute eN for e, this becomes
When an increase in the corporate tax rate lowers eN, the balanced
growth condition requires an offsetting increase in the remaining part
of the right-hand side of (2.10). Since this expression varies inversely
with p for any feasible values of 6* and fi, an increase in the corporate
tax rate requires a reduction in the dividend payout rate.^^
We calculated that, with b constant, increasing from 0.40 to 0.50
would reduce eN by 0.0077. Since eN = 0.071 at the initial numeral
values,!^ this is a reduction of 10.8 percent. To continue to satisfy the
balanced growth equation, the dividend payout ratio must fall from
0.50 to 0.43.19
III. EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE TAXATION OF RETAINED
EARNINGS
A central feature of the corporate-type tax is that retained
earnings are taxed at a lower effective rate than dividends. Under
current U. S. law, retained earnings are not subject to any personal
income tax as such. The resulting capital gains are taxed at a rate less
than the rate on dividend income, and the tax is assessed only when
the asset is sold. We have parameterized the extent to which retained
earnings are sheltered by /u: M = 1 representing no advantage to re-
tained earnings over dividend income, and )u = 0 representing a zero
rate of tax on retained earnings (allowing for the effect of postponement and the lower
capital gains tax rate) are reasonable for the United States; these imply that x = 0.82.
From (1 - b)e = (1 - T)(/' - bi), we ohtain (1 - b)eN = x(l - T)(/' - bi) = 0.497. Total
after-tax income per dollar of capital is therefore 0.0560 of which equity investors re-
ceive 89 percent.
17. More formally, it can be shown that 1/(1 — p)d(l — p)ldT = —f'le.
18. Note 16 showed that (1 - b)eA, = 0.497. Since b = 0.3, eN =0.071.
19. More generally, equation (2.1) can be used to calculate dx/dr and then dp/dr
derived by using the definition that x = (1 — nd) — (1 — )^424 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
effective tax on retained earnings. Thus, differentiating with respect
to fi corresponds to studying decreased levels of sheltering.
The effects of changing ju run through two channels. Directly,
/u. alters the effective tax rate on equity income x. Thus, M influences
the cost of capital for fixed values of e^v and iAT. Indirectly, the induced
change in e, after firms have adjusted to the new cost of capital, will
influence the payout rate p necessary to satisfy the steady-state
equation. This feeds back onto the effective tax rate because it alters
the part of equity income that is sheltered.
Intuitively, we would expect to find that reducing the extent of
sheltering lowers the after-tax total return to equity eN. This is true
in this model. Moreover, we shall show that changes in the retained
earnings provisions are otherwise neutral (provided that ??' = 0),
leaving the gross returns, the net interest rate, and the dividend
payout rate unaffected.
3.1. Uncompensated Shifts in ju
Recall that our basic equation system, (1.17)-(1.20), and its total
differentiation (2.1) are written in terms of the endogenous variables,
b, eN, iN, and x, with /Li as a fixed parameter. This form is inconvenient
for the purpose of studying the effects of varying /j. because /x enters
into the definition of x. By rewriting the system with p, instead of x,
as the fourth endogenous variable, we can see the effects of fx more
simply. To do so, note that p, fi, and x are related by the defini-
tion,
(3.1) x=p{l-d) + {l-p){l~tie).
Thus, in differentiating (1.20)-(1.23) totally with respect to b, eN, iN,
p, and ju, it is only necessary to use
(3.2)
to convert (2.1) into an equivalent system in these variables. This
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• 1
1-T .
0
z
- b 1-T ^ (1 - b)e,v(J(l -
0 ;;
(3.3)
X X 1-0
1-6-X 0 -[{1 - n)6n - eN]6{l
—1 1 — r ~eN
0
[(1 - ii)6n -
db
dp
- p) + 6nx
dfx.
The matrix on the left-hand side of (3.3) is just the same as that
in (2.1) with the last column multiplied by dx/dp = —6{1 — fi). Thus
assuming that rj' = 0,^0 we see that its determinant is
(3.4)
(3.5)
(3.6)
1-0 X
We obtain the following comparative static results:
= -On < 0
dn
= 0.
The particularly simple form of these expressions is worthy of
note. The decrease in eN in response to a higher effective tax on equity
is no surprise. Its dependence on n, the growth rate, results from the
fact that retentions are constrained in equilibrium by the growth rate.
Therefore, in a faster growing economy with a higher retention rate,
the nature of the taxation of retained earnings and capital gains will
be more important to equity owners.
The result that iN is unaffected is somewhat more surprising and
20. Throughout this section we shall maintain this condition. Little in the way
of precise analytic results can be ohtained if the aggregate deht-equity ratio is flexible
and can respond to shifts in the composition of the cost of capital. Of course, on the
firm level in our model, the cost of capital can be affected hy financing changes of this
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is an important conclusion that follows from the behavioral equations
of the model. When /J. increases, the initial impact is felt on all the
equations of the system (except b = rj{iN — eN), which does not matter
when 7j' = 0). The firm has a cash flow deficit, as can be seen from
equations (1.18) and (3.2). The retention ratio is no longer compatible
with a steady state (from (1.19)),- and bond finance becomes un-
derutilized, since the value of e necessary to provide the original net
return ejv is higher. It is important to note that if eN and p were to
change so as to restore cash-flow balance, they would also re-equili-
brate the cost of capital at its original level. This can be seen simply
by noting that eN and p enter both of these equations in the form eN/x
only. Since iN does not enter the steady-state equation at all, it is clear
that the new equilibrium is achieved only by changing ejv and x, and
leaving tjv at its original level.^^
To summarize in economic terms, the constancy of iN results
from the fact that the cost-of-capital equation and the cash flow
equation both embody eN, x, and ix in precisely the same functional
form. Viewed in this way the result is no surprise at all. These equi-
librium relations are concerned with firms' behavior and as such de-
pend only on the returns to capital gross of personal taxation; in
particular, the tax on retained earnings enters only through e, which
is fixed in steady-state equilibrium.
Note that since iN and 6 are unchanged, so is i. Therefore, the
cost of capital minimization can be compatible with a fixed b only if
e is also unchanged.
From the steady-state condition, n = (1 — p)e, it is clear thatp
must also be constant. An uncompensated for change in the sheltering
provision for retained earnings affects only the net return to equity
through a shift in the effective tax on equity income. There are no
further repercussions through the general equilibrium of the system.
In this sense the differential taxation of retained earnings, unlike the
corporate profits tax itself, is neutral.^^
3.2. Compensated Shifts in fi
In concluding this section, it is interesting to ask what happens
when fl and r are changed simultaneously in a way that keeps the net
burden of the tax unchanged while increasing the degree of sheltering
of retained earnings. In our notation this involves lowering fx and
21. This follows formally from the singularity of the matrix in (3.3), when the
coefficients of dn are substituted for the third column.
22. It should be emphasized again that this neutrality holds only in the special
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raising T in a way that keeps biN + (1 — b)eN unchanged.^^ This can
also be interpreted as making the tax more like a corporation tax. In
the extreme case of complete integration of the personal and corporate
taxes, fx= 1, and r = 0; there is then no difference in the taxation of
dividends, retained earnings, and interest; as M falls and r rises, we
move toward the current type of corporation tax.
Since an increase in r lowers iN, while a change in fx does not alter
iN, the combined change in r and fX also lowers iN. The requirement
that the net portfolio yield {MN + (1 — b)eN) remain unchanged
implies that eN must rise. As the equal yield tax changes in the di-
rection of a corporate-style tax, the net equity yield increases, while
the net return on debt falls. Moreover, since dp/dT < 0 and dp/dfx =
0, the compensated change of increased sheltering has the effect of
increasing the fraction of income that is retained.
IV. THE NONNEUTRALITY OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX
Our analysis has shown that tbe curient stiuctuie of coiporate
and personal taxes can substantially distort the financial behavior
of firms. This occurs, even though we have assumed that the stock of
capital at each instant of time is fixed and that all business activity
occUTS in a coipoiate form. If we diop either of these assumptions,
there is a further source of distortion in either the intertemporal or
intersectoral allocation of resources. Before discussing the possibility
of such additional distortions, we shall examine the nature of the
nonneutrality of the corporation tax in a one-sector economy with a
fixed growth rate.
Consider first the nonneutrality of the tax law with respect to the
debt-equity ratio. Our analysis showed that the current tax system
induces firms to increase their debt-equity ratio. The essential reason
for this substitution is that interest payments are deductible in cal-
culating taxable income, while the returns to equity are not. The ex-
tent of the substitution is limited because every rise in the firm's
debt-equity ratio increases the perceived uncertainty of the firm's
interest and equity payments, and this perceived risk raises the cost
to the firm of both debt and equity capital. A new equilibrium debt-
equity ratio is established at the point where the tax advantage of
deductibility just balances the cost induced by the increased riskiness
of heavier leverage.
This analysis stands in sharp contrast to two models recently
23. Recall that we are assuming that •>)' = 0 and therefore tbat b is fixed. Fixing
the net portfolio yield 6ijv -F (1 - 6)e^ is equivalent to fixing the net burden of the
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developed by Stiglitz that imply that the corporation tax does not
affect the debt-equity ratio. In the first model Stiglitz [1973] postu-
lated that firms retain all of their earnings (i.e., pay no dividends) and
can borrow at a fixed interest rate to finance investment in excess of
these retained earnings. Since all marginal investments are financed
wholly by debt in that model, the introduction of a corporate income
tax has no effect. The important contribution of that paper is the
reminder that previous studies of the corporation tax have been de-
ficient in assuming that all corporate investment is financed wholly
by equity. Stiglitz's own assumption that firms can borrow as much
as they want at a fixed interest rate is crucial to his conclusion. Stiglitz
explicitly recognizes that his assumption would only be tenable in an
economy in which there is no uncertainty and would then imply that
the marginal product df capital equals the rate of interest (f' = i). The
inability of this model to explain why any dividends are paid is a
further warning against accepting its other conclusions.^"*
In a subsequent analysis Stiglitz [1976, Section 5] developed a
quite different model in which the interest rate paid by the firm is an
increasing function of the firm's debt-equity ratio. In the context of
this model Stiglitz again concluded that a corporate income tax would
not change the firm's optimal debt-equity ratio. More specifically,
Stiglitz posited an individual investor who divides his wealth between
investment in a corporation (which he controls and which also borrows
from others at a rate of interest that is an increasing function of the
firm's debt-equity ratio) and investment in an unspecified alternative
asset with a fixed return. In Stiglitz's formulation of the problem, the
introduction of a corporate income tax does not alter the investor's
optimal investment or borrowing decisions. This conclusion rests on
the unwarranted assumption that the introduction of a corporation
tax at rate T reduces the net yield on the "alternative asset" by the
same factor of 1 — T that is applied to net corporate income.^^ No
reason is offered for this critical assumption. Moreover, the as-
sumption is clearly false if the "alternative asset" is assumed to be the
market portfolio of debt and equity or the debt issued by other cor-
porations. The yield on the alternative asset will fall by the corporate
tax rate only if this alternative asset consists exclusively of equity in
other firms. However, this implies that any individual who owns
corporate equity invests only in corporate equity regardless of the tax,
24. These remarks should not he regarded as a criticism of Stiglitz's model (which
we believe makes an important analytic contribution) but as an explanation of why
its implications should not he regarded as directly relevant for any actual economy.
25. The crucial character of this assumption is clear, since Stiglitz's argument
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while corporate bonds are held by a wholly separate group. It thus
appears that Stiglitz's result that the debt-equity ratio temams un-
affected by the tax follows from an implicit assumption that there are
two classes of investors, one of which invests only in equity while the
other invests only in debt. We therefore reject the "neutrality" con-
clusion of Stiglitz's second model.
In their justifiably famous article Modigliani and Miller [1958]
showed tbat under certain conditions a firm's debt-equity ratio is
indeterminate. One of these crucial conditions is the absence of any
taxes. The introduction of tbe corporation tax in the simplest Modi-
gliani-Miller framework implies that firms will finance their invest-
ment by debt only. In his recent Presidential address to the American
Finance Association, Miller [1976] surveys tbe attempts to extend the
model to include taxes without reaching this extreme and unrealistic
implication. Miller concluded correctly that previous analyses have
ignored the tax features that favor equity finance, i.e., the absence of
any personal tax on retained earnings and the relatively low rate of
tax on capital gains. He then argues that this favorable treatment of
equity could re-establish the indeterminacy of the debt-equity ratio
and could therefore explain (witbout introducing considerations of
risk related to the debt-equity ratio) why firms bave not relied more
on debt finance. More specifically. Miller points out that the debt-
equity ratio is indeterminate if (in our notation) (1 — ^) = (1 — T)
X [p(l-O) -I- (1 -p)(l -M^)]; i.e., if the after-tax yields on debt and
equity are equal. However, since 6 <T and p(l — ^) + (1 — p)(l — (xS)
< 1, tbis required "indifference condition" is definitely not satisfied
in practice. Although Miller is right to stress the full structure of tax
incentives, we believe the observed mix of debt and equity can be
explained only by incorporating the risk-piemium effects of changes
in the debt-equity ratio (i.e., (/>' > 0 and \(/' > 0).26
In addition to noting the potential effect of the corporation tax
on the debt-equity ratio, our own analysis pointed out that the cor-
porate tax lowers the net rate of interest^'' (as well as tbe yield on
equity capital) and reduces the dividend payout rate. Thus, even in
the case of an all-corporate economy with a fixed capital stock, the
corporate income tax affects every margin of choice.
26. Miller appears to accept this at certain places in his address but generally
stresses the "indifference condition" and minimizes the importance of uncertainty.
Since Miller does not present an explicit complete model, we are uncertain of his final
judgment.
27. Stiglitz [19731 concluded that the net rate of interest would be unchanged bv
the corporation tax, hut this rests on the assumption that marginal investments are
financed wholly by debt and thus indirectly on the assumption of a riskless
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It is useful to consider the implications of extending our analysis
to the type of two-sector economy studied hy Harherger [1962,1966].
In this economy, fixed total supplies of capital and lahor are divided
between corporate and noncorporate production. All capital is equity
capital. The introduction of a tax on capital income in the corporate
sector involves an excess hurden hecause the allocation of capital and
lahor between the two sectors is distorted. The introduction of debt
finance along the lines developed in our model does not eliminate this
excess burden. It is clear from Section II that I'AT and e^v are both de-
creased by the introduction of a corporate income tax; this would
induce a shift of capital from the corporate to the noncorporate sector
until the net rates of return were again in equilibrium.^^ Note that this
change in the allocation of capital and labor might also change the
marginal product of labor.
If the savings rate is not fixed, but depends on the net yield to
savers, the corporate income tax will also distort the intertemporal
allocation of resources. In the all-corporate economy, the corporate
tax reduces iN and e^f and tberefore the return on the market port-
folio. This raises the price of future consumption relative to the price
of current consumption and therefore distorts individual consumption
and saving decisions. This entails an efficiency loss even if there is no
net change in private saving [Feldstein, 1977]. The distortion is more
complex in an economy with noncorporate as well as corporate firms
but the conclusion concerning a potentially large intertemporal
misallocation of resources remains unchanged.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have examined the long-run effects of a corpo-
rate-type profits tax in a growing economy. Our model explicitly in-
cludes optimization by individual firms of their debt-equity ratio and
dividend payout rate.
The analysis shows that tbe corporate-style tax is nonneutral in
several important ways even tbough debt finance is available and the
interest payments are deductible in the calculation of taxable income.
Even if the economy's saving rate is fixed and all business activity
occurs in the corporate form, changes in tbe tax rate would alter tbe
firms' debt-equity ratio and the dividend payout rate as well as the
net-of-tax rates of return earned on both equity and debt investments.
28. The corporation tax reduces the risk as well as the yield of corporate sector
investment. The risk effect could in principle outweigh the yield effect and cause capital
to flow into the corporate sector [Penner, 1964]. The implication would still be that
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With a more general specification of saving behavior and the recog-
nition of an untaxed noncorporate sector, it is clear that this reduction
in the net equity and deht yields will alter hoth saving and the allo-
cation of capital hetween the corporate and noncorporate sectors.
There are several directions in which the current model should
he extended. We have ignored inflation here even though we previ-
ously found (with a simpler model) that the interaction of inflation
and taxation can he of substantial importance.^^ Although we have
discussed the general implications of our research for a two-sector
economy, an explicit analysis of the effect of a corporation tax when
there is deht and equity finance of the type we analyze and an untaxed
noncorporate sector remains to he done. Finally, we have dealt ex-
clusively with the long-run, steady-state characteristics of the econ-
omy; it would clearly be useful to analyze the transitional behavioT
of both corporate borrowing and divi.iend decisions.
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